by Zachariah Kay, The Canadian Jewish News, February 12, 1998
Canada's policy of non-commitment toward a Jewish state prior to 1948 reflected the British-oriented attitude of Liberal prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, an excessively cautious but masterful politician.
He remained supportive of Britain's mandate policy although there had been vestiges of Christian support for Jewish restoration in the Holy Land couple with the activities of the Zionist-led Canadian Jewish community. King's caution also accounted for Canada's delay in recognizing Israel following its establishment on May 14, 1948.
King retired in November 1948. He was succeeded by Louis St. Laurent and he, in turn, by Lester B. "Mike" Pearson at External Affairs. Pearson, who was internationally inclined and a United Nations (UN) supporter, had already acquired a high reputation particularly through his conciliatory and mediatory roles seeking solutions to the Palestine question. The kudos he earned were again repeated towards the end of Israel's first decade when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
On Christmas eve 1948, a month after King left office, Ottawa granted de facto recognition to Israel thereby moving from non-commitment to active diplomatic support for Israel's viability. Still, in relation to the nascent state, Canada never was too far ahead of its British and French allies or outside the sphere of American Middle Eastern policy.
When Israel was finally admitted on May 1, 1949 to the United Nations, Canada conferred full (de jure) recognition upon the Jewish state. That was followed some eight days later by the arrival in Montreal of Avraham Harman as Israel's first consul general.
In September 1953, the Israeli Foreign Ministry's first British Commonwealth head, Michael Comay, was appointed minister plenipotentiary and subsequently ambassador in Ottawa. At the same time Terry MacDermott was named Canada's non-resident ambassador to Israel with the embassy based in Tel Aviv.
Ottawa had supported and worked for the adoption of partition including the internationalization of Jerusalem, but it accepted the Palestinian Conciliation Commission's position recommending the Holy City's division between Israel and Jordan.
Canada advocated maximum local autonomy and protection of the Holy Places pending a final peace settlement. Nonetheless, it neither recognized Israeli sovereignty over west Jerusalem nor Jordanian sovereignty over the eastern part of the city. When Israel proclaimed Jerusalem its capital in December 1949, Canada demurred from any advocacy of internationalization. That did not, however, diminish its support for UN involvement in the area as Canadian Maj.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns became head of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East.
In the early '50s, the government had been selling a modest amount of defensive weapons to Israel and training aircraft to Egypt. In 1955, a major arms deal of offensive weaponry between Czechoslovakia (on behalf of the Soviet Bloc) and Egypt created and egregious arms imbalance in the region. As a result of this new and alarming regional development, the Liberal government was urged by the Progressive Conservatives and the social democratic Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF forerunner of the NDP) to respond.
Israel applied to the Canadian government to purchase 24 state-of-the-art Canadian-built F-86 Sabre jet interceptor fighters. After drawn out consultations and negotiations with the United States and other NATO allies, the St. Laurent government finally approved the sale in September 1956. But with the outbreak of the Sinai-Suez conflict on Oct. 29, the sale was suspended, and never came to fruition.
The St. Laurent government responded negatively to the Anglo-French military initiative. It also generated heated debate from the Conservatives and the CCF opposition although both were sympathetic to Israel.
The UN convened its first Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly at the beginning of November. Lester Pearson produced a deus ex machina in proposing as a solution to the immediate crisis, the establishment of the first truly international emergency force (UNEF), to be interposed in the Sinai between the warring countries. UNEF's subsequent success as an ad hoc fire brigade, under the direction of Burns, earned Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize.
The federal election in June 1957 brought an end to 22 consecutive years of Liberal rule. The Diefenbaker-led Conservatives were sworn into office. While the new prime minister was known to be pro-British, he had always supported the Jewish homeland and had been a supporter of the proposed Sabre jet sale.
In 1958, under the Diefenbaker government, Margaret Meagher was appointed Canada's first resident ambassador to Israel. While continuing to enhance economic relations between the two countries, the Diefenbaker government also hosted the first official visit by then prime minister David Ben-Gurion in May 1961.
From 1963 to 1968, Pearson led a Liberal minority government. Bi- and multiculturalism were very much on the nation's agenda as was an effort to develop expanded relations with the Third World. The crisis of May 1967, presaging the Six Day War in June, resulted in Ottawa's opposition to Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser's closing of the Straits of Tiran and blocking the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.
Ottawa criticized both Egypt's actions and secretary general U. Thant's subsequent acquiescence in the removal of the UNEF interposed between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai.
In parliament on June 8, Pearson outlined a six-point peace plan for the situation. It called for a UN presence, freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf Aqaba, demilitarized zones and an intensified effort to resolve the Arab refugee issue.
Diefenbaker, now the leader of the Opposition, demanded more support for Israel and called upon the government to back Israel's right to Jerusalem, which had just become reunited.
Then External Affairs minister Paul Martin reiterated the points of Pearson's proposed settlement at the UN, adding the need for a special representation of the Secretary General. That eventually led to the passing of Security Council Resolution 242 on Nov. 22, 1967. The impact of the Six Day War overshadowed another milestone in the relationship between the two countries when then president Zalman Shazar made the first state visit by an Israeli, during Canada's centennial at the Universal Expo in Montreal.
In general, the first two decades of Canadian-Israeli relations were influenced by Pearson's internationalism even when he and his party were returned to the benches of the Opposition. Diefenbaker, a longtime supporter of the Zionist cause, basically maintained his predecessor's policies towards Israel.
Subsequent decades bore witness to shifts in Ottawa's policy.
With the advent of the Pierre Trudeau-led governments and the country's constitutional, bicultural and multicultural soul-searching, Canada began veering from international idealism and started focusing on economic relations.
Through the governments of Joe Clark, then again Trudeau, Brian Mulroney and finally Jean Chrétien, "evenhandedness" -- or more accurately, increased attention to Arab sensibilities, was clearly manifested.
Israel began to emerge as a regional power, losing its Occidental underdog appearance. More pro-Arab voices gained the government's ear. Nevertheless, Ottawa's Middle Eastern policy still maintained, and was guided by, traditional Canadian caution.
At the outset of the third decade, the 1968 election produced a Liberal majority under Trudeau's stewardship. The new External Affairs minister Mitchell Sharp inaugurated a general study of Canada's international relations. The study confirmed the already-begun transition from "internationalism" to "evenhandedness" on the Middle East. This meant greater cognizance of the Arab states.
One expression of that policy was increased support for Arab refugees. In the two and a half decades ending in 1974, Canada had contributed $32 million toward the refugee situation; an amount which far out-stripped that of a combination of many Arab states.
The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo affected Canada in spite of its fossil fuel wealth. The Arab boycott of Israel was also felt in the Canadian business community. Ottawa's promise to enact anti-boycott legislation was never fulfilled; although Ontario did enact such a law.
During this time, Canada's diplomatic policies continued to inch towards recognition of Arab Palestinian rights. Canada's stand on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) at international conferences was ambiguous and controversial. For example, the Habitat conference that was held in Canada included participation by the PLO. But Canada opposed the resolution in the General Assembly equating Zionism with racism. Diefenbaker sponsored a resolution in the House of Commons condemning the General Assembly vote that passed unanimously on Nov. 12, 1975.
During the fourth decade, Canada joined the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Prime minister Menachem Begin visited Canada in November 1978, and urged Trudeau to move the Canadian Embassy to Jerusalem.
With the 1979 election, a minority Progressive Conservative government led by Clark came to power. During the election campaign, Clark had in fact promised to move the embassy to Jerusalem. The promise immediately produced a great deal of pressure from Arab and Canadian commercial interests opposing the move. Eventually Clark was compelled to rethink his pledge, in spite of counter-pressure from the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC).
Former federal Conservative leader Robert Stanfield was called upon to re-examine the embassy issue. As expected, his commission recommended that the embassy not be moved. The issue has lain dormant in governmental circles ever since.
The Camp David accords and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 won Ottawa's support as did the other ongoing efforts to foster the peace process.
In September 1984, the Progressive Conservatives under Mulroney won an unprecedented majority with Clark becoming the minister of External Affairs. In the wake of the Lebanon war of 1982, the government became more critical of Israeli policy.
At the same time, a report by the Senate's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs took a more aggressive tone. It supported Canada's contribution to UN peacekeeping forces and to the Multinational Force and Observes in Sinai (MFO); it called for curbing terrorism and violence and for the need to ensure Israel's security. But it also called for a halt of Israeli settlements and for Palestinian representation in the peace process.
The fifth decade in the 50-year relationship began with jarring criticism of Israel. The government appeared to be moving closer to the European Community's position on the Middle East. The break in the traditional attitude occurred on March 10, 1988, in a speech at the annual CIC dinner in Ottawa by Clark in which he was highly critical of Israel.
Clark tried to modify the impact of his acutely negative remarks in a subsequent speech but not very successfully or convincingly.
When Barbara McDougall replaced Clark as minister of External Affairs in 1991, Canada had become an established member of the G-7 and was still enmeshed in constitutional soul-searching. As an outcome of the multinational Madrid peace conference Canada became moderator of the Middle East Refugee Panel.
The federal elections of October 1993, and again of June 1997, brought and kept the Liberals under Chrétien in office along with substantial gains for the Bloc Québécois and the Reform party. "Evenhandedness" was the principle plank of Middle East diplomacy by foreign ministers André Ouellet and Lloyd Axworthy.
Last autumn's crisis over the use of forged Canadian passports by Israeli agents in the Meshal affair led to a temporary recalling of the Canadian ambassador. That reaction by the government was unprecedented in the almost half century relationship between the two countries, but was of insufficient consequence to imperil Canadian-Israeli diplomacy. It did, however, seem to tighten Canada's traditional cautious approach to diplomacy in the region.
Having looked back over five decades of Canada-Israel diplomacy, it might also be meaningful to briefly glance back over what transpired in the 50 years prior to Israel's rebirth.
Henry Wentworth Monk, popularly known as the "Prophet of Ottawa" preached the restoration of Zion and some of his works were read into the Canadian Senate's records. Also read into the record were Sir Wilfrid Laurier's condemnation of pogroms; Sir Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen's support for the Balfour Declaration -- prior to and subsequent to its promulgation.
Prime Minister R. B. Bennett's support in a 1934 radio speech for the Keren Hayesod-United Palestine Appeal gave credence to the fact that Canadian Jews were predominantly Zionist. The Liberal and Conservative parties varied in their positions, however, the CCF had as its official policy the establishment of a Jewish state as was in sharp contrast to the right-wing and anti-Semitcally-tinged Social Credit party.
Whatever developments loom on the diplomatic horizon of Canadian-Israeli relations is best left to the prophets and not to the pontifications of amateur and professional pundits. Surveyors and analysts will assume their tasks, as I have, in another five decades.
One can safely bet, however, that for a long time to come caution and prudence will still rule in the offices of Canadian decision-makers.
This article is based mainly on the writer's contribution to the New Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel. A native Winnipegger and a research fellow of the Leonard Davis Institute For International Relations, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Kay's latest book is the Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-58, (McGill-Queen's University Press).